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PA 17013-5010.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College Press (USAWC) Press publications
may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in
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the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications,
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For over a decade, SSI has published the annual Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) to inform students,
faculty, and external research associates of strategic topics requiring research and analysis. Part I of the
Academic Year (AY) 2013-14 KSIL, referred to as the Army Priorities for Strategic Analysis (APSA), has
been developed by Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) and SSI. The APSA will help
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and external researchers, to link their research efforts and results more effectively to HQDA’s highest
priority topics. To improve the relevance of the research and analysis, topics are directly linked to chiefs
or points of contact (POC) within appropriate HQDA divisions or directorates. These POCs will advise
researchers as to specific topics and results needed to better shape research, analysis, and results that
meet the Army’s needs.
NOTE: Topics with (***) are priority Chief of Staff of the Army topics.

CONTENTS
FOREWORD
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY SPECIAL INTEREST TOPICS
1. Provide modernized and ready, tailored land force capabilities to meet combatant
commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations.
Near-Term Objectives:
Train for Operational Adaptability
Continue to Increase the Integration Between Conventional Forces and Special
Operations Forces
Integrate Lessons Learned and Capabilities Gained in Recent Operations into the
Generating Force and Operational Army
Continue to Maintain a Global Stabilizing Presence
Adapt the Army Force Generation Model
Regionally Align Forces
Institute Army Total Force Policy
Set Theaters Via Capable Army Service Component Commands and Theater
Support Forces
Provide Ready and Trained Forces for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear Response Forces for Operations in the Homeland Balance Active
and Reserve Component Force Readiness
Mid-Term Objectives:
Modernize Equipment to Prepare for Future Challenges
Increase the Combat Power of Army Formations
Ensure That Forces are Capable of Joint Entry Operations
Protect Friendly Mission Command Systems and Impede Enemy Information at
the Tactical and Operational Level
Long-Term Objectives:
Develop the Plan for Mission Tailored Force Packages
2. Develop leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st century
Near-Term Objectives:
Train, Educate and Provide Leaders with Experience
Enhance Broadening Opportunities
Reinforce the Army Profession in the 21st Century

iii

Mid-Term Objectives:
Develop Leaders Who are Proficient in Cyberspace and Enhance
Our Cyber Professional Workforce
3. Adapt the Army to more effectively provide land power.
Near-Term Objectives:
Reform and Restructure the Institutional Army
Reset the Force
Mid-Term Objectives:
Continue to Modernize Business Operations
Rebalance the Generating Force
Set Conditions to Expand the Army When Called Upon
Provide Infrastructure and Support to Fulfill Its Strategic Roles and Missions
Long-Term Objectives:
Field the Army of the Future
4. Enhance the all-volunteer Army
Continuous Objectives:
Maintain an Army That Embraces and Leverages the Diversity of Soldiers

iv

FOREWORD
Today’s global environment is the most uncertain the Army has faced in several
decades. It is unpredictable and dynamic. We do not know when we will have to
deploy Soldiers to fight again; but history tells us that we will. We owe it to them to
ensure they have the proper resources to be ready when needed.
Research on the topics contained in this document will assist us in shaping the Army
of the future. In 2012, the Army began with an initial vision of this future in the Army
Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG). The 2013 ASPG refined that vision by
incorporating a year’s worth of study, analysis, and experience. Through research in the
following topics, we will continue to transition to the Army of the future. We organized
these topics to support the four imperatives and related objectives discussed in the 2013
ASPG.
We must decide which capabilities and knowledge gained over the past decade-plus
of combat we will develop further, which we will maintain, and which we will allow to
go dormant. We must decide how to organize, train, and equip our Army efficiently to
prepare it for the uncertain global environment ahead of us. To assist in doing so, we
publish the Army Priorities for Strategic Analysis (APSA).
The Chief of Staff, Army is keenly interested in each of the topics listed; however, I
highlight a subset of these topics at the front of the document, the analysis of which is
truly critical to the Army’s future success, and I strongly encourage U.S. Army War
College students and Fellows to consider those priority issues, as well as others listed in
the APSA. The Army needs your study and analysis today more than ever. The APSA
also provides fertile ground to be tilled by our external research associates.
Given today’s fiscal realities and the dynamic strategic environment, the Army’s
vision, direction, and objectives must continue to evolve so that we can adapt to global
challenges. Through our collective research and analysis efforts, our armed forces will
gain strength through wisdom.
ANTHONY A. CUCOLO III
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant
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CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY SPECIAL INTEREST TOPICS
1. If we do not plan to engage in “long wars” and we do not plan to “mobilize for the
duration,” then how should the Army change the way it thinks about the roles of the
RC and how to utilize them? Is the RC too large? Should it be larger? What is the “right
mix” of force allocation between the AC and RC? (POC: COL 5REHUW+XJKHV, HQDA G3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, 5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-693-3240)
2. How important is speed—both in terms of maneuver and information? How would
the requirements for the Joint Force change if we changed assumptions about required
speed of responsiveness and of campaign conclusion? What does the historical record
show about the levels of responsiveness we have actually been able to achieve (and the
levels of readiness of the responding force), and how does that compare to how we plan
to employ the force? (POC: COL 5REHUW+XJKHV, HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management
and Integration, 5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-693-3240)
3. Re-computing “Tooth to Tail”—Lines between “tooth” and “tail” have blurred in a
net-centric environment and in an environment of Combined Arms Maneuver/Wide
Area Security occurring simultaneously. How do we measure “Tooth to Tail”? How
should we measure it (or should we not measure)? How should we best frame the
discussion? How can we test for “tooth to tail” sensitivity?” (POC: COL 5REHUW+XJKHV,
HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, 5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703693-3240)
4. There currently exists a dangerous gap in the development of Army doctrine in
regard to countering potential asymmetric threats. Current doctrinal efforts focus on
Phases II and III of the Joint operational planning phases. Propose a strategy for
identifying/countering asymmetric threats in Phases 0, I, IV, and V. What are the limits
to countering asymmetric threats in these phases? (POC: COL Dick Larry, HQDA G3/5/7, Adaptive Solutions, dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil, 703-697-4916)
5. How can the Army efficiently increase collaboration with the other services across
the DOTMLPF spectrum towards implementation, and further spiral development, of
the Joint Operational Access Concept? Which specific Army capabilities should be
prioritized for further and more robust multi-service experimentation and wargaming
with follow-on integration into joint exercises to implement and enhance the Joint
Operational Access Concept and supporting Air-Sea Battle concept? (POC: COL John
Goetz, HQDA G-3/5/7, Air/Sea, john.c.goetz3.mil@mail.mil, 703-614-9705)
6. Consider the rationale for previous force restructuring. Given the increasing
emphasis on budget austerity, do the efficiencies gained in a Divisional force with a
DISCOM, DIVARTY, Engineer Brigade, and Intelligence and Signal Battalions outweigh
the advantages of a Modular Force Structure? Is the criteria for measuring “efficiencies”
vi

today different than in the past? (POC: COL Mark Berglund, HQDA G-3/5/7,
Organizational Integration, mark.j.berglund.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-7953)
7. Explain the doctrinal and operational relationships between “Building Partner
Capacity,” “Security Cooperation,” “Security Assistance,” and “Security Force
Assistance.” Describe how the Army currently contributes to each of these, if the
contributions are the “right” efforts at the appropriate levels, and ways that the Army
can improve on its contributions. (POC: Mr. Mark McDonough, HQDA G-3/5/7,
Multinational Strategy and Programs, mark.e.mcdonough4.civ@mail.mil, 703-692-7807)
8. How can the Army best integrate and synchronize the functions included within
what DoD terms countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) across the Army
Staff, DOTMLPF, and subordinate commands? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G3/5/7, USANCA, juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil, 703-806-7852)
9. Given previous work with respect to anti-access/area denial in space and the recent
Space CBA, what changes to policy, roles, and missions should the Army consider to
assure its space-dependent warfighting functions? What capabilities will the Air Force,
Navy, and National Reconnaissance Office develop? Will their capabilities serve Army
needs in space? If not, then how should the Army alter its roles and missions in space?
(POC: /7&(G$QGHUVRQ, HQDA G-3/5/7, Space, (GZDUGJDQGHUVRQPLO#PDLOPLO,
703-607-588)
10. Determine COAs to equip the RAF concept:
• Should the Army build TOEs that correspond with RAFs?
• How can/should the Army APS structure best support RAF?
• Should the Army build RAF equipment sets to support rotation of forces?
• How do you support the logistic requirements for this equipment set?
(POC: COL 5REHUW+XJKHV, HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration,
5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-693-3240)
11. Can the significant amount of vertical lift capability resident in the Army be
integrated into emerging Air-Sea battle doctrine? What are the requirements for a CAB
to train for sea-based operations, especially in an anti-access/area denial environment?
How can Army Aviation complement Marine capabilities in sea-based helicopter
operations? (POC: COL Vincent Torza, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation Systems,
jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-1634)
12. Given the rise of small UAS, especially those at the platoon level, how might the
area of operations of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) change? How might such a change
impact the overall force structure of the Army? How have previous technological
advancements impacted force structures in the past? (POC: Mr. James Ryan, HQDA G3/5/7, Unmanned Aerial Systems, james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil, 703-693-3552)
vii

PART I:
ARMY PRIORITIES FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
ARMY STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE:
ARMY IMPERATIVES
1. Provide Modernized and Ready, Tailored Land Force Capabilities to meet
combatant commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations.
Near-Term Objectives:
a. Train for Operational Adaptability
1) Evaluate current and previous efforts of Security Sector Reform/Defense
Sector Reform (SSR/DSR) as conducted through the Department of State (DoS),
Department of Defense (DoD), and international partners. Assess where positive and
negative outcomes have occurred. Drawing on such findings, recommend a potential
model or framework through which the Army could improve support to SSR/DSR.
(Point of Contact (POC): Ms. Rachel Smith, Headquarters Department of the Army
(HQDA) G-3/5/7, International Affairs, rachel.m.smith.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-9587)
2) What are the key skills and attributes the Army must sustain to retain the
capability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, and how will
the Army develop and sustain those skills and attributes? Civil Affairs? (POC: Mr. Tim
Muchmore, HQ G-8, QDR, timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-5591)
3) ***Can the significant amount of vertical lift capability resident in the Army
be integrated into emerging Air-Sea battle doctrine? What are the requirements for a
combat aviation brigade (CAB) to train for sea-based operations, especially in an antiaccess/area denial environment? How can Army Aviation complement Marine
capabilities in sea-based helicopter operations? (POC: COL Vincent Torza, HQDA G3/5/7, Aviation Systems, jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-1634)
b. Continue to Increase the Integration between Conventional Forces and Special Forces
4) In order to positively shape the operational environment for unified action,
the Army must effectively employ strategic Landpower. Historically, Army Special
Operations Forces (SOF) have focused efforts on human interaction. Army
Conventional Forces (CF) have specialized in combined arms maneuver with less
regard for the impact of human interaction. Given the current level of uncertainty in the
strategic environment along with the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept, analyze
how SOF and CF might become more interdependent across each operation plan phase,
and describe some ways and means through which SOF and CF can efficiently increase

1

their capabilities through interdependent actions. (POC: COL :LOOLDP&DUW\-U, HQDA G3/5/7, Special Operations Division, ZLOOLDPMFDUW\PLO#PDLOPLO, 703-695-8490)
c. Integrate Lessons Learned and Capabilities Gained in Recent Operations
5) During the past decade-plus of conflict, the U.S. Army has faced numerous
types of asymmetric threats from adversaries seeking to evade U.S. Army overmatch
capabilities on the battlefield. The Army responded by developing rapid and adaptive
processes to counter and defeat these new threats. However, with the coming reduction
of Army personnel and funding, there is significant risk of the erosion of the capabilities
and knowledge gained over the course of these operations. How can the Army best
institutionalize the lessons learned over the past decade, or should the Army make the
deliberate decision to relearn these capabilities in future conflict? Should the Army
adjust its policies and procedures in response to the last conflict or deliberately decide
to allow future Army leaders to innovate to solve their specific problems of the day?
(POC: COL Dick Larry, HQDA G-3/5/7, Adaptive Solutions, dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil,
703-697-4916)
6) Based upon the experiences of the past decade of conflict, especially in
regard to Army and DoD efforts to counter the improvised explosive device (IED)
threat, should the Army institutionalize a Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO)-like organizational ability to identify and address future
asymmetric threats as they emerge? If so, what capabilities and resources would such
an organization require, and where should it reside? (POC: COL Dick Larry, HQDA G3/5/7, Adaptive Solutions, dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil, 703-697-4916)
7) After the United States departs Afghanistan, opportunities to gain
experience in coalition missions may be limited. How valuable is coalition experience to
the U.S. Army? How can the Army sustain the knowledge gained through the coalition
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan? (POC: COL Thomas Moffatt, HQDA G-3/5/7,
Military Observers Group, thomas.j.moffatt.mil@mail.mil, 703-545-7150)
d. Continue to Maintain a Global Stabilizing Presence
8) How does U.S. Army support for international/United Nations (UN)
operations enhance U.S. national security? The policy governing command and control
of individual soldiers assigned to international and UN operations is over 40 years old.
How should the U.S. Army conduct command and control of these personnel? (POC:
COL
Thomas
Moffatt,
HQDA
G-3/5/7,
Military
Observers
Group,
thomas.j.moffatt.mil@mail.mil, 703-545-7150)
9) How do we institutionalize lessons learned in building partner capacity
since September 11, 2001 (9-11) and then apply them as we go forward?
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10) Due to the increased emphasis on Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and
Building Partner Capacity (BPC), how can we develop metrics and a net assessment to
determine that shaping and engagement actions work? Develop recommendations to
measure and assess these actions and prioritize where the Army needs to focus its
efforts?
11) How much can we increase our reliance on new and traditional friends and
allies? How do we encourage our friends and partners to carry a larger (more
proportionate?) share of the international security responsibility? (POC: Mr. Tim
Muchmore, HQDA G-8, QDR, timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-5591)
e. Adapt the Army Force Generation Model
12) Should the Army continue to utilize the Army Force Generation
(ARFORGEN) as a core process versus its use of a temporary wartime procedure? How
does the Army’s Title 10 requirement to generate forces change based on conditions and
demand? (POC: COL Todd Key, HQDA G-3/5/7, War Plans, todd.e.key.mil@mail.mil,
703-697-7458)
f. Regionally Align Forces
13) ***Determine courses of action (COAs) to equip the RAF concept:
• Should the Army build Table of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) that
correspond with RAFs?
• How can/should the Army Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) structure
best support RAF?
• Should the Army build RAF equipment sets to support rotation of forces?
• How do you support the logistic requirements for this equipment set?
(POC: COL 5REHUW+XJKHV, HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration,
5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-693-3240)
14) As the Army moves towards implementation of the Regionally Aligned
Forces (RAF) concept, what is the best way to implement Army Aviation within RAF?
An aviation task force to support a RAF may have to operate in multiple types of
environments. How does this potential impact Army Aviation’s ability to adequately
support RAF? Are environmentally qualified Aviation units more effective than
regionally-aligned units? (POC: LTC David George, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation-Current
Operations, david.a.george.mil@mail.mil, 703-695-0209)
15) Due to the increase in the operating tempo (OPTEMPO), reduced resources
and efforts of the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the recently released DoD
Initiative (DoDI) 5111.20, assess the feasibility to incorporate the State Partnership
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Program as integral to the RAF. (www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511120p.pdf, State
Partnership Program).
(COL Lorelei Coplen, USAWC, PKSOI, Lorelei.e.coplen.mil@mail.mil, 717-245-3740)
16) How can the RAF concept be implemented to benefit the Republic of Korea
(ROK)-U.S. Alliance? Moreover, what is the optimal role of the RAF? (POC: MAJ
Matthew Yiengst, Eighth U.S. Army, Strategic Planner, matthew.c.yiengst.mil@mail.mil)
g. Institute Army Total Force Policy
17) The Militia System and the Creighton Abrams experiment may have run
their course. Should the Army rethink force mix and component roles? Part of this may
include focusing the ARNG on homeland defense as part of the Department of
Homeland Security. What other important Active Component (AC)/Reserve
Component (RC) mix issues should be examined as the Army draws down. (POC: Mr.
Tim Muchmore, HDAQ G-8, QDR, timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-5591)
18) Due to the increasing tempo of operations and need for responsiveness, is it
time to reexamine the “Abrams doctrine” and look at the possibility of going to war
without the RC and operate for a period of time solely with the AC? Does deploying the
RC really influence public support?
h. Set Theaters via Capable Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) and Theater
Support Forces
19) ***Explain the doctrinal and operational relationships between “Building
Partner Capacity,” “Security Cooperation,” “Security Assistance,” and “Security Force
Assistance.” Describe how the Army currently contributes to each of these, if the
contributions are the “right” efforts at the appropriate levels, and ways that the Army
can improve on its contributions. (POC: Mr. Mark McDonough, HQDA G-3/5/7,
Multinational Strategy and Programs, mark.e.mcdonough4.civ@mail.mil, 703-692-7807)
20) What should the roles and missions of corps and ASCCs be? Are they
duplicative? (Dr. John Bonin, USAWC, CSLD, john.a.bonin.civ@mail.mil, 717-245-3457)
21) The U.S. Army cannot prevent and shape conflict everywhere. Within each
geographic combatant command, where are the key places the Army needs to engage in
order to best support U.S. national security objectives? What advice should the Army
provide to civil leadership on the engagement-risk tradeoff? (POC: LTC Francis Park,
HQDA G-3/5/7, Strategic Engagements, francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-9450)
22) How can Army Air and Missile Defense improve the balance between Army,
Joint and Combatant Command (COCOM) priorities in a fiscally constrained
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environment? (POC: LTC Kurt Johnson, HQDA G-3/5/7, Air and Missile Defense,
kurt.w.johnson6.mil@mail.mil, 703-607-1203)
23) What is the Army role in supporting evolving U.S. policy towards Africa
(post Libya, Mali, Algeria, etc.) and possible expansion of U.S. Africa Command’s
(AFRICOM) role in helping secure/promote U.S. interests on the continent?
24) The Security Cooperation mission crosses over agency boundaries—
principally a State department lead, with military support, dominated by Foreign
Military Sales (FMS). What are the missions, roles, and responsibilities of the various
stakeholders? There are numerous stakeholders within the Army who conduct security
cooperation activities. Is there a need to have a single Army proponent for Army
security cooperation to better synchronize holistic security cooperation efforts (to
include security assistance) in order to support Guidance for the Employment of the
Force (GEF) end states? (POC: Mr. Mark McDonough, HQDA G-3/5/7, Multinational
Strategy and Programs, mark.e.mcdonough4.civ@mail.mil, 703-692-7807)
25) What are the long term benefits and risks of land forces on Korea, in North
East Asia, in the Asia-Pacific region? (POC: MAJ Matthew Yiengst, Eighth U.S. Army,
Strategic Planner, matthew.c.yiengst.mil@mail.mil)
26) Interoperability is often cited as a key way to enhance the benefits and
effectiveness of multinational operations. Even after over a decade of coalition
operations, there is a lack of cohesion in efforts to increase interoperability between the
United States and its allies and partners. Discuss what interoperability is and its
components and what it means to a participating nation. Describe a potential
overarching interoperability policy that accounts for minimum standards for
interoperability, that sets criteria for countries with which the United States should be
interoperable, and recommends means, methods and/or processes (existing or needed)
to achieve such interoperability and increase coherency of efforts. (POC: Ms. Alicia
Weed, HQDA G-3/5/7, Multinational Programs, alicia.g.weed.civ@mail.mil, 703-6931989)
i. Provide Ready and Trained Forces for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) Response Forces for Operations in the Homeland
27) ***How can the Army best integrate and synchronize the functions included
within what DoD terms Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) across the
Army Staff, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF), and subordinate commands? (POC: COL Juan
Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA, juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil, 703-806-7852)
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28) Many active CBRN forces are on orders/Prepare To Deploy Orders (PTDO)
to support Homeland Defense missions. Given the magnitude of this mission, they are
considered unavailable for overseas contingency missions. Assess if the active force
requirements to support potential Homeland Defense and Domestic Response missions
are adequate. Are these active CBRN forces able to meet future overseas contingency
operations given the domestic requirements? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G3/5/7, USANCA, juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil, 703-806-7852)
29) Army General Purpose Forces (GPF) are a critical for the success of the Joint
Force Counter-WMD operations. Is the current Brigade Combat Team (BCT)-organized
force more effective than the Division-based force for supporting Joint Forces CWMD
operations as the major component (and lead) for Unified Land Operations? (POC: COL
Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA, juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil, 703-806-7852)
30) Joint and Army strategic planning guidance documents clearly identify
Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) as a means to train foreign forces to support
regional coalitions. Likewise, disaster relief and consequence management forces that
are regionally-based can offer a quicker response to a disaster/humanitarian incident.
How could U.S. Consequence Management/CBRN forces be employed to train regional
forces in this technical mission? What are the costs and requirements to initiate such a
BPC program? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA,
juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil, 703-806-7852)
j.

Balance Active and Reserve Component Force Readiness

31) ***If we do not plan to engage in “long wars,” and we do not plan to
“mobilize for the duration,” then how should the Army change the way it thinks about
the roles of the RC and how to utilize them? Is the RC too large? Should it be larger?
What is the “right mix” of force allocation between the AC and RC? (POC: COL 5REHUW
+XJKHV,
HQDA
G-3/5/7,
ForceManagement
and
Integration,
5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-693-3240)
32) What is the Army’s responsibility to provide a strategic reserve? In the
context of the on-going drawdown, what is the capacity of the Army to provide a
strategic
reserve?
(POC:
Mr.
Tim
Muchmore,
HQDA
G-8,
QDR,
timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-5591)
33) Sustaining the aviation fleet remains a top priority for the Army. The
OPTEMPO and resources of the past decade have permitted high states of readiness
and maintenance. Given the impact of budget constraints on aviation readiness, how
must sustainment evolve in order to ensure the health of the fleet? Describe some ways
to properly incentivize more efficient sustainment of Army aircraft. (POC: COL Vincent
Torza, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation Systems, jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-1634)
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34) What is the appropriate composition of aviation assets across the AC, the
RC, and National Guard (NG)? For example, does the NG have a requirement for AH64s and/or does it make more sense that greater lift capability reside in the RC? (POC:
COL Vincent Torza, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation Systems, jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil,
703-692-1634)
35) Section 12304a of Title 10 gives the Secretary of Defense authority to order
any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit of the
army Reserve to active duty for a continuous period of not more than 120 days to
provide assistance in response to a major disaster or emergency. Discuss the various
issues at stake when USAR elements are mobilized to conduct homeland support
operations. Develop a potential strategy through which the Army can efficiently
execute such an order. (POC: LTC Deborah Scott, HQDA G-3/5/7, Mobilization,
deborah.s.scott2.mil@mail.mil, 703-693-8982)
36) Section 12304b of Title 10 gives the Secretary of Defense authority to order
any unit of the Selected Reserve (as defined in Title 10, Section 10143a) to active duty for
not more than 365 consecutive days to augment the active forces for a preplanned
mission in support of a combatant command. Discuss the various issues at stake when
USAR elements are mobilized to augment a combatant command. Develop a potential
strategy through which the Army can efficiently execute such an order. (POC: LTC
Deborah Scott, HQDA G-3/5/7, Mobilization, deborah.s.scott2.mil@mail.mil, 703-6938982)
37) Trace the series of presidential executive orders that have mobilized the
Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to active duty from Operation DESERT STORM
through the present day. Considering this history as well as the missions conducted by
the Ready Reserve beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, outline a potential strategy for the
future of U.S. AR and NG mobilization. What is the value of the Ready Reserve as an
operational force? What is the value of the Ready Reserve as a strategic reserve?
Recommend ways in which the Army can leverage the RC to balance the concepts of
scalability and responsiveness in the future. (POC: LTC Clayton Gardner, HQDA G3/5/7, Mobilization, clayton.e.gardner.mil@mail.mil, 703-697-2002)
Mid-Term Objectives:
k. Modernize Equipment to Prepare for Future Challenges
38) The new Defense Guidance directs a transition from a narrow to a broader
focus for the Army as it prepares for future potential conflicts and adversaries
represented by a complex and interconnected global operational environment, as
articulated in the Army’s Equipment Modernization Strategy. Considering the expected
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likely future strategic environment how should the Army balance force protection,
mobility and fire power in its vehicle fleet? As part of this consideration, what is the
future role of the two variants of Stryker-equipped brigades? Also, what are the
advantages and disadvantages of a Bradley-based replacement for the M113 family?
(POC: COL Richard Holdren, HQDA G-3/5/7, Experimentation and Testing,
richard.j.holdren.mil@mail.mil, 703-545-4363)
l. Increase the Combat Power of Army Formations
39) ***Given the rise of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), especially those
at the platoon level, how might the area of operations of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
change? How might such a change impact the overall force structure of the Army? How
have previous technological advancements impacted force structures in the past? (POC:
Mr.
James
Ryan,
HQDA
G-3/5/7,
Unmanned
Aerial
Systems,
james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil, 703-693-3552)
40) Consider the current measures of Army readiness. What are the
relationships between readiness, capacity, and capability? How can readiness measures
evolve to increase their value to the commander with respect to a unit’s mission set?
(POC:/7& 3 5RQ/XNRZ,HQDA
G-3/5/7,
2'5,
URQDOGJOXNRZPLO#PDLOPLO
703-697-)
41) What are the implications of current technology on the Army’s BCT
structure? What are the dimensions of battle space that a modern BCT covers? Do these
dimensions differ significantly across the potential operational environments?
Recommend a new force structure that leverages scalability and responsiveness to
contingencies. (POC: COL Richard Holdren, HQDA G-3/5/7, Experimentation and
Testing, richard.j.holdren.mil@mail.mil, 703-545-4363)
m. Ensure that Forces are capable of Joint Entry Operations
42) Evaluate the tradeoffs of power projection, prepositioning, and forward
stationing.
43) What role do ground forces play in defeating an adversary’s antiaccess/area-denial strategies?
44) Given previous work with respect to anti-access/area denial in space—
Tactical Space Protection Study, National Security Strategy for Space, National Military
Strategy for Space Operations, DoD Definition for Space Resilience—and the Joint
Operational Access Concept, what might be the best way for the Army to assure its
space-dependent warfighting functions in an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)
environment where space systems are degraded for substantial periods of time? How
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could the Army reduce the degree and/or duration of degradation through
implementation of various alternate space and nonspace means? Some examples of
such mitigation include the deployment/employment of tactical satellite constellations,
use of high-altitude long-loiter orbits, and use of unmanned aeriel vehicles
(UAVs)/UASs. (POC: /7&(G$QGHUVRQ
HQDA G-3/5/7, Space,
(GZDUGJDQGHUVRQPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-607-588)
n. Protect Friendly Mission Command Systems and Impede Enemy Information
45) The relationship between Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare is
described as one of convergence, but in reality the two are, and should remain,
inextricably linked but separate. Understanding the relationship between Cyberspace
Operations and Electronic Warfare is essential to sufficiently exploit opportunities and
defend vulnerabilities within these related areas. Analyze the symbiotic nature of their
relationship, articulate the separation and the similarities of the two, and describe the
impact of conducting Cyber Operations and Electronic Warfare to achieve national
security objectives. (POC: COL Charles Ekvall, HQDA G-3/5/7, Electronic Warfare,
charles.j.ekvall.mil@mail.mil, 703-614-6795)
46) The recent establishment of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) directs
the Commander to also serve as Director, National Security Agency, leaning toward an
intelligence-centric mission. Yet, the associated Service Cyberspace mission is to build,
operate, and defend the network which is primarily a communication-centric mission.
Given USCYBERCOM’s mission to direct operations, defend networks, and, on order,
conduct full spectrum operations, has DoD appropriately framed the command and
control of military cyberspace forces? (POC: COL Carmine Cicalese, HQDA G-3/5/7,
Cyber/Information Operations, carmine.cicalese.mil@mail.mil, 703-695-1864)
Long-Term Objectives:
o. Develop the Plan for Mission Tailored Force Packages
47) The Defense Strategic Guidance from January 2012, Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, states that “Even when U.S. forces are
committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the
objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a
second region.” For Army forces, develop a definition of “denying the objectives of . . .”
and consider how the Army might contribute to such a “deny” mission. (POC: LTC
Francis Park, HQDA G-3/5/7, Strategic Engagements, francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil, 703692-9450)
48) The Defense Strategic Guidance from January 2012, Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, states that “Whenever possible, we will develop
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innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying
on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” For Army forces, define
“low-cost, and small-footprint approaches“ and suggest how the Army might contribute to
such an approach. (POC: LTC Francis Park, HQDA G-3/5/7, Strategic Engagements,
francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-9450)
2. Develop Leaders To Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century
Near-Term Objectives:
p. Train, Educate and Provide Leaders with Experience
49) How can the Army prepare, train, and retain officers with the necessary
multifaceted experience to take on a broad range of missions and roles? What is the best
way to prepare officers to succeed in a world of change, complexity, and uncertainty?
50) Should Department of the Army civilians be developed just as officers and
non-commissioned officers (NCOs)? If so, how should that be done?
51) Why is Army representation in key joint billets lower than the other
services?
52) Analyze the effectiveness of the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS)
in setting the conditions for, and developing Soldiers capable of leading a diverse
military and civilian workforce in a precarious resource environment and who
constantly adapt to meet future security challenges in an increasingly uncertain,
complex, and interconnected global environment. What are the measures of
effectiveness for the Army Leader Development Strategy and how will the Army know
that implementation is fully realized, successful, and effective? Ensure the analysis
builds on the 2013 Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Leader Development Task Force
(LDTF) Study and Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Leadership (CASAL)
feedback. Analysis should include perspectives on "developing others" and
"transforming personnel processes," (specifically "talent management"). POC: Ms. Terri
Ashley, HQDA G-3/5/7, Training Directorate, terri.l.ashley.civ@mail.mil, 703-692-7779.
53) Describe what goals, objectives, measures, and management plan the Army
can use to best ensure the principles of Mission Command are embedded in leader
development. Offer recommendations to more widely communicate Mission Command
to all cohorts (Army Civilian, Non-commissioned Officer, Warrant Officer, and Officer).
POC:
Ms.
Terri
Ashley,
HQDA
G-3/5/7,
Training
Directorate,
terri.l.ashley.civ@mail.mil, 703-692-7779.
q. Enhance Broadening Opportunities
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r. Reinforce the Army Profession in the 21st Century
54) The Army Profession emerged from a year-long introspective examination of
how more than a decade of war have affected the Army as an institution and what it
means to be a member of the Army Profession. In addition to efforts such as the Army
Profession Campaign and the "America's Army" - Our Profession, CY13 Training and
Education Program, how can the Army most effectively foster continued commitment
to the Army Profession? Offer recommendations to more widely instill and
communicate the Army Profession to all cohorts (Army Civilian, Non-commissioned
Officer, Warrant Officer, and Officer). POC: Ms. Terri Ashley, HQDA G-3/5/7, Training
Directorate, terri.l.ashley.civ@mail.mil, 703-692-7779.
55) Honoring Public Trust: The Army Profession and Ethic -- Evaluate Army
Profession Doctrine and the Army Ethic as the basis for internal and external trust
relationships. What are the measures of effectiveness for how well the Army Profession
Doctrine is practiced, understood, embodied by all cohorts? Is the internal trust
relationships different than the external trust relationships, if so, what are some possible
reasons? Ideas for improving trust within and outside the Army. POC Mr. Chris Rizzo,
HQDA G-3/5/7, Training Directorate, Christopher.j.rizzo.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-9734.
56) Professional Dissonance: Tensions between Culture and Institution -Analyze tensions between Army culture and institutional requirements and evaluate
the effect of the Army Culture as it pertains to institutional requirements. How do the
Army’s talent management processes affect this tension? How are meeting institutional
requirements viewed by the Army Profession? POC Mr. Chris Rizzo, HQDA G-3/5/7,
Training Directorate, Christopher.j.rizzo.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-9734.
Mid-Term Objectives:
s. Develop Leaders Who are Proficient in Cyberspace and Enhance Our Cyber Professional
Workforce
57) How do we assess, develop, and employ leaders for cyber warfare? (POC:
COL Carmine Cicalese, HQDA G-3/5/7, Cyber/Information Operations,
carmine.cicalese.mil@mail.mil, 703-695-1864)
3. Adapt the Army to More Effectively Provide Land Power
Near-Term Objectives:
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t. Reform and Restructure the Institutional Army
58) As the Army returns its institutional focus to combined arms maneuver,
what organizational, doctrinal, and technological innovations stemming from a decade
of counterinsurgency could contribute to success in conventional warfare? What should
we preserve? (POC: COL Todd Key, HQDA G-3/5/7, War Plans, todd.e.key.mil@mail.mil,
703-697-7458)
59) How does the phrase Irregular Warfare (IW) help DoD understand and solve
military or security challenges? Are the current definitions appropriate, and necessary?
How does that definition incorporate or explain IW’s relationship with Stability? With
COIN? (COL Lorelei Coplen, USAWC, PKSOI, Lorelei.e.coplen.mil@mail.mil, 717-2453740)
60) Should COIN include Stability tasks as critical components or should COIN
be better described as an activity to conduct within a Stability operation? (COL Lorelei
Coplen, USAWC, PKSOI, Lorelei.e.coplen.mil@mail.mil, 717-245-3740)
u. Reset the Force
61) ***Consider the rationale for previous force restructuring. Given the
increasing emphasis on budget austerity, do the efficiencies gained in a Divisional force
with a Division Support Command, Division Artillery (DISCOM, DIVARTY), Engineer
Brigade, and Intelligence and Signal Battalions outweigh the advantages of a Modular
Force Structure? Is the criteria for measuring “efficiencies” today different than in the
past? (POC: COL Mark Berglund, HQDA G-3/5/7, Organizational Integration,
mark.j.berglund.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-7953)
62) Personnel availability tends to challenge the Army much more than it does
the Air Force, Navy, and Marines. Describe the Army’s ability to absorb its
“unavailable” personnel. Examine the current facts, analyze the consequences of those
facts, and recommend ways to mitigate the impact of the Army’s unavailable personnel.
(POC:
/7& 3
5RQ
/XNRZ,
HQDA
G-3/5/7,
2'5,
URQDOGJOXNRZPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-697-)
63) Evaluate the current Army readiness reporting structure:
• Do current Army readiness reporting requirements provide a portrayal of
unit readiness measured during specific moments in time/ARFORGEN
Cycle?
• Should the Army report unit readiness against current/future
ARFORGEN aim points?
• Evaluate if “requirement equals authorizations” remains viable in an era
of declining resourcing.
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(POC: COL 5REHUW+XJKHV, HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration,
5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-693-3240)
64) Is the Army over-structured in its Grade Plate? Do we need the Leader-Led
ratio we have today because of operational changes or because of grade inflation
(compensation/retention policies)? How do we define requirements-by-grade and do
we do it well/correctly? How could we do it differently and should we? (POC: COL
5REHUW+XJKHV, HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration,
5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-693-3240)
65) What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of the Maneuver
Enhancement Brigade vs. Chemical, Engineer and Military Police Functional Brigades?
Is there a place in the Army’s Force Structure for both? If the number of headquarters
and size of headquarters remain a challenge based on end strength reductions, which
should remain in the force? (POC: COL Mark Berglund, HQDA G-3/5/7,
Organizational Integration, mark.j.berglund.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-7953)
Mid-Term Objectives:
v. Continue to Modernize Business Operations
66) ***Re-computing “Tooth to Tail”—Lines between “tooth” and “tail” have
blurred in a net-centric environment and in an environment of Combined Arms
Maneuver/Wide Area Security occurring simultaneously. How do we measure “Tooth
to Tail?” How should we measure it (or should we not measure)? How should we best
frame the discussion? How can we test for “tooth to tail” sensitivity?” (POC: COL
5REHUW+XJKHV, HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration,
5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-693-3240)
w. Rebalance the Generating Force
67) Expansibility and reversibility: How should the Army (Operational and
Generating Force) organize to ensure it is expansible should it need to grow to meet
demand in time of conflict? (POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HQDA G-8, QDR,
timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil, 703-614-5591)
x. Set Conditions to Expand the Army When Called Upon
68) ***How important is speed—both in terms of maneuver and information?
How would the requirements for the Joint Force change if we changed assumptions
about required speed of responsiveness and of campaign conclusion? What does the
historical record show about the levels of responsiveness we have actually been able to
achieve (and the levels of readiness of the responding force), and how does that
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compare to how we plan to employ the force? (POC: COL 5REHUW+XJKHV, HQDA G3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, 5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-693-3240)
69) The American way of war typically expands the Army to meet wartime
needs and then contract it after the conflict. But, generally since WWII, the Army tends
to only plan for either the expansion or the contraction. How would the Army plan
differently if it developed a holistic plan on how it would both expand for conflict and
then contract following conflict? How might that change personnel policy?
Procurement policy? Installation planning? Roles of the RC? (POC: COL 5REHUW+XJKHV,
HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, 5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703693-3240)
70) In between conflicts, the Army cannot afford to equip and sustain the entire
force with the most advanced equipment, but it must be prepared to procure large
quantities once war funding is available. The U.S. Army equipment modernization
strategy requires an industrial base that can react to the increased quantity demanded
during national emergencies while still retaining the ability to buy smaller quantities
between major conflicts. What are the implications of this approach on the defense
industrial base and what policy adjustments may be needed to make this feasible?
(POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HQDA G-8, QDR, timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil, 703-6145591)
y. Provide Infrastructure and Support to Fulfill its Strategic Roles and Mission
71) As the Armed Forces of the United States moves toward a more joint
environment, there is a need to better understand the concept and application of joint
basing. The Base Realignment and Closure of 2005 (BRAC) recommended the
consolidation of numerous service bases into fewer joint bases. The Army, however, has
failed to understand, and hence take advantage of, the joint basing concept. Describe
the opportunities for the Army that exist with joint basing. Recommend ways to more
efficiently align the stationing process across the military departments and services.
(POC:
LTC
Michelle
Sanchez,
HQDA
G-3/5/7,
Mobilization,
michelle.sanchez.mil@mail.mil, 703-693-6153)
72) Evaluate use of contracted logistical support for Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM/Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OIF/OEF):
• Should the Army develop a core capability in force structure to provide
some aspects of logistical support provided by contractors in OIF/OEF?
• Is there capability within the current BCT structure, ARNG, and USAR
that can expand to offset some of the requirements provided by
contractors during OIF/OEF? What are the tradeoffs?
(POC: COL 5REHUW+XJKHV, HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration,
5REHUWVKXJKHVPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-693-3240)

14

Long-Term Objectives:
z. Field the Army of the Future
73) What is the role of Landpower in support of the U.S. National Security
Strategy? (POC: LTC Francis Park, HQDA G-3/5/7, Strategic Engagements,
francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil, 703-692-9450)
74) ***There currently exists a dangerous gap in the development of Army
doctrine in regard to countering potential asymmetric threats. Current doctrinal efforts
focus on Phases II and III of the Joint operational planning phases. Propose a strategy
for identifying/countering asymmetric threats in Phases 0, I, IV, and V. What are the
limits to countering asymmetric threats in these phases? (POC: COL Dick Larry, HQDA
G-3/5/7, Adaptive Solutions, dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil, 703-697-4916)
75) ***How can the Army efficiently increase collaboration with the other
services across the DOTMLPF spectrum towards implementation, and further spiral
development, of the Joint Operational Access Concept? Which specific Army
capabilities should be prioritized for further and more robust multi-service
experimentation and wargaming with follow-on integration into joint exercises to
implement and enhance the Joint Operational Access Concept and supporting Air-Sea
Battle concept? (POC: COL John Goetz, HQDA G-3/5/7, Air/Sea,
john.c.goetz3.mil@mail.mil, 703-614-9705)
76) ***Given previous work with respect to anti-access/area denial in space and
the recent Space Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA), what changes to policy, roles,
and missions should the Army consider to assure its space-dependent warfighting
functions? What capabilities will the Air Force, Navy, and National Reconnaissance
Office develop? Will their capabilities serve Army needs in space? If not, then how
should the Army alter its roles and missions in space? (POC: /7&(G$QGHUVRQ,
HQDA G-3/5/7, Space, (GZDUGJDQGHUVRQPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-607-588)
77) What constitutes a “hostile act” or an “act of war” when it comes to
engagements with UAS? Are UAS-to-UAS engagements acts of war since there is not an
imminent threat to loss of human life? How does the right to self-defense change when
engaging with UAS? Is the development of rules of engagement with respect to UAS
analogous to the development of rules of engagement with respect to aggressive acts in
cyberspace? (POC: Mr. James Ryan, HQDA G-3/5/7, Unmanned Aerial Systems,
james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil, 703-693-3552)
78) What is the expanding role of small UAS in ground maneuver units? Within
the larger context of maneuver unit reconnaissance, are UASs and traditional aviation
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more like complements or substitutes? How do the respective Centers of Excellence best
integrate collective UAS and maneuver training? (POC: Mr. James Ryan, HQDA G3/5/7, Unmanned Aerial Systems, james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil, 703-693-3552)
79) Organizing aviation assets by type makes sense when concerned more about
training efficiency than contingency operations. During the past decade-plus of conflict,
however, many aviation assets have operated in combat as composite battalion task
forces and some have remained organized as composite battalion task forces during
their dwell. Given the expected likely future strategic environment, what is the most
efficient organization of aviation assets? Should Army Aviation remain organized for
contingency operations (i.e., composite battalion task forces) or for training purposes
(i.e., same-type aircraft)? (POC: LTC David George, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation-Current
Operations, david.a.george.mil@mail.mil, 703-695-0209)
80) Given the advent of nano-satellite technology and the potential for Army
missiles to be converted to low-Earth orbit launch systems, how could tactical satellite
constellations be employed to augment space systems or to compensate for loss of space
systems in order to ensure space-dependent warfighting functions? What might be the
value of low-Earth orbit tactical satellite constellations tailored to ground component
needs in particular Joint Operating Areas (JOAs)? (POC: /7&(G$QGHUVRQ,
HQDA G-3/5/7, Space, (GZDUGJDQGHUVRQPLO#PDLOPLO, 703-607-588)
4. Enhance the All-Volunteer Army
Continuous Objectives:
aa. Maintain an Army the Embraces and Leverages the Diversity of Soldiers and Civilians
81) Senior Leader Diversity: The Army is behind in its initiatives to ensure a
continuing stream of racial/ethnic representation in our officer corps. What policies are
needed to address this concern? (JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
STUDIES)
82) Examine the leadership challenges associated with the recent decision to
allow women in combat units and the potential development of gender neutral
standards. (Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA])
83) How does the Army change its human resource management to assess,
develop, assign, and employ soldiers as individuals, not as generic soldiers?
84) Is suicide an Army or societal problem or both?
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85) What issues emerge with the latest cohort of veterans? How does the
treatment of veterans affect public opinion of the military?
86) What should the role of retired general officers be in partisan matters?
87) How can ROTC academic standards be adjusted to reflect the needs of the
Army?
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1. GEOGRAPHICAL COMBATANT COMMANDS
A. U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)
(POC: Mr. Michael Bowerbank, Michael.r.bowerbank.civ@mail.mil, +49 (0) 711-7294460)
1) How can the joint force adapt to best implement Program Planning
Document (PPD)-23 on security sector assistance? Given the new guidance contained in
PPD-23 on Security Sector Assistance and the increased focus on building the capacity
of willing security partners, how does the Department of Defense (DoD) further adapt
the joint force to conduct this enduring mission? (J5)
2) How does DoD best position itself to partner with other U.S. Government
agencies on security sector reform efforts in Africa? What authorities are required to
enhance DoD’s effectiveness in carrying out security sector reform assistance, including
Rule of Law, in Africa? (J9)
3) How can USAFRICOM best support the advancement of women as agents of
peace and security? How can USAFRICOM focus its Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
activities with its African partners to best support the U.S. Government’s
implementation of PPD-16? (J5)
4) How can concepts of gender and the “Responsibility to Protect” be
integrated into peace support operations in Africa? (J9)
5) In light of the President’s Study Directive (PSD) on Mass Atrocities (PSD-10),
what are methods to effectively measure the effectiveness of mass atrocities prevention
efforts? What are some of the barriers to U.S. Government efforts to prevent mass
atrocities in Africa? (J2)
6) Assess the long-term implications of the Arab Spring on security. What does
the future picture of Northern Africa and the Sahel look like? (J9)
7) Assess U.S. Government and international efforts to build defense
institutions in Mali, Somalia, and Libya. Are the efforts coordinated, de-conflicted, and
complimentary? Do any of them undermine the others? Are they independently
sustainable after being implemented, or do they require perpetual U.S. or international
partner involvement? (J2)
8) Is South Africa’s military overstretched with international peacekeeping
operations? What type of assistance would be most beneficial to their participation in
peacekeeping operations? (J2)
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9) To what extent do Middle Eastern countries influence (military, ideological,
economic, and diplomatic) African countries? (J2)
10) What are the short-, medium-, and long-term risks and opportunities to U.S.
security of the expansion of Chinese infrastructure in Africa? How can the extensive
Chinese computer network infrastructure investments place U.S. security at risk, and
what opportunities does it provide? What are the best whole-of-government strategies
to ensure U.S. interests are met in Africa despite China’s infrastructure expansion
engagement strategy? (J3)
11) Assess the ways and means to leverage and increase collaboration,
integration, and cost-sharing of USAFRICOM, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), European Union (EU), and Western nations’ exercises on the African
continent. (J7)
12) How can DoD and USAFRICOM best measure effectiveness and return on
investment of theater logistics security cooperation in Africa? (J4)
13) Assess the risks inherent in transnational surface distribution networks
across Africa and possible mitigation measures. (J4)
14) Assess how the procurement of non-U.S. military equipment is shaping the
development of African militaries. (J2)
15) Are African Ministries of Defense and/or security forces employing NonLethal weapons (NLWs) and capabilities to mitigate undesired consequences associated
with civil disturbances as opposed to using lethal capabilities to address public
uprisings? (J3)
16) Do African countries, who contribute forces to Peace Keeping Operations
(PKO) and Peace Support Operations (PSO), integrate NLW training into their training
cycles for PKO/PSO? If so, what types of NLWs are integrated and how are they
employing the capabilities, e.g., to provide fixed site security, airfield security, support
humanitarian relief operations or some combination thereof? (J3)
17) How can the Army best provide support in an environment that is changing
from joint operations to interagency operations? With the environment and asymmetric
threat increasing in complexity, the need to work operations with support from the
Department of State (DoS), the Department of Transportation (DoT), the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), etc., becomes more and more imperative. How should the Army
change its doctrine to accommodate near real-time support necessary to achieve
national security staff tasked efforts under these new and prevalent conditions? (J3)
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B. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
1) The global technology enhanced environment requires strategic awareness
by joint force commanders. This awareness requires an understanding of the
operational environment within and adjacent to the joint operating area (JOA) at the
tactical and operational as well as the strategic theater level. What should the Common
Operating Picture (COP) and Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) portray for leaders
preparing for and conducting joint operations from subordinate joint task force (JTF)
and functional component through combatant command (CCMD) HQ levels? (POC:
Mr. Jerry Boyle, CCJ2-PS, Jerome.boyle@centcom.mil, 813-529-2072)
2) What are the implications to Middle East regional security resulting from
Iranian assertiveness and malign behavior? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL,
bj.keepers@centcpom.mil, 813-529-3354)
3) What are the regional implications following a withdrawal of U.S. combat
forces in Afghanistan? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, bj.keepers@centcpom.mil, 813-5293354)
4) Evaluate possibilities and strategic implications of Chinese, Russian, and
Iranian expansion of their interests in Afghanistan. (Lieutenant Commander (LCDR)
Michael J. Puffer, CCJ5-G, Michael.puffer@centcom.mil, 813-529-5065)
5) Assess Pakistan’s strategic options towards U.S. strategy in the region,
especially
towards
Afghanistan.
(LCDR
Michael
J.
Puffer,
CCJ5-G,
Michael.puffer@centcom.mil, 813-529-5065)
6) What are the implications of emerging military relationships within the
Middle East dealing with counterterrorism? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL,
bj.keepers@centcpom.mil, 813-529-3354)
7) How does an increasingly resource constrained environment over the next
10 years impact current U.S.-Middle East regional strategy? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-OCAL, bj.keepers@centcpom.mil, 813-529-3354)
8) Should the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) boundaries between
USEUCOM and USCENTCOM as specified in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) be
redrawn to expand the reach of USCENTCOM to the waters adjacent to the Levant?
(Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, bj.keepers@centcpom.mil, 813-529-3354)
9) Evaluate the opportunities and challenges to transfer operations control
(OPCON) of American forces to foreign commanders. Assess the required changes to
founding documents to enable this transfer. Assess changes to tactics, techniques and
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Procedures (TTPs) to ensure success of such a transfer. (LCDR Michael J. Puffer, CCJ5G, Michael.puffer@centcom.mil, 813-529-5065)
10) How should the Army train Soldiers for missions in a counterinsurgency
(COIN) environment, where great emphasis is placed on the limitation of civilian
casualties (CIVAS) and the use of NLW throughout the Escalation of Force (EOF)
continuum, while still retaining warfighting as its primary mission, while not losing its
edge as the nation’s premier combatant force? (Dr. Mike Sizemore, CCJ7-E,
Michael.sizemore@centcom.mil, 813-529-7060)
11) The fiscal constraints we are facing, combined with desired strategic
objectives, require USCENTCOM and Components to maximize resources within a
multinational exercise strategy. This strategy will increase joint integration,
interoperability, and information sharing between partner nations. In addition, it will
offer greater strategic messaging opportunities emphasizing a broader coalition within
the region supporting the commander’s (CDR) guidance and priorities. How can we
improve this process? (Dr. Mike Sizemore, CCJ7-E, Michael.sizemore@centcom.mil, 813529-7060)
12) How can a CCMD effectively and synchronously acquire, aggregate, and
synthesize pertinent information on the results and effects created across all elements of
power employed to achieve theater objectives? (Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John
Michaud, CCJ8-ARB, john.michaud@centcom.mil, 813-529-8121)
13) Wargaming provides CCMDs the opportunity to visualize various courses of
actionn (COAs) and in doing so, identify risks, opportunities, and potentially better
means and ways for accomplishing the mission. What are the best practices being
leveraged within DoD and among the CCMDs? How do the CCMDs integrate
wargaming into their deliberate and hasty planning processes? What tools, techniques,
and practices are available to improve wargaming efforts? (LTC John Michaud, CCJ8ARB, john.michaud@centcom.mil, 813-529-8121)
Logistics and Deployment:
14) Examine the posturing options and recommend the best employment of
Army land-based prepositioned (PREPO material and Operational Project Stocks) in the
conduct of a maritime campaign in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment.
(Mr. Richard Lliteras, CCJ4-S, Richard.lliteras@centcom.mil, 813-529-4054)
15) Examine the relevance of the Army’s expeditionary railroad capability in
support of expeditionary operations, coalition deployment and redeployment support,
line of communication (LOC) expansion, and regional economic development. (Mr.
Larry Pleis, CCJ4-S, Lawrence.j.pleis@centcom.mil, 813-529-4053)
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16) Concerning operational contracting—is the Army postured adequately to
support the Joint Force? (Mr. Larry Pleis, CCJ4-S, Lawrence.j.pleis@centcom.mil, 813-5294053)
17). Conduct a comparative analysis of a Joint Logistics Command and a Joint
Task Force for Logistics to support enduring and contingency Combatant Commander
requirements. (Mr. Larry Pleis, CCJ4-S, Lawrence.j.pleis@centcom.mil, 813-529-4053)
18) Evaluate the impact of a closure of the Suez Canal on Army deployments
into the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). (LCDR Michael J. Puffer, CCJ5-G,
Michael.puffer@centcom.mil, 813-529-5065)
19) Propose an ideal Army posture in the CENTCOM AOR with ways to shift
from the current basing structure. (LCDR Michael J. Puffer, CCJ5-G,
Michael.puffer@centcom.mil, 813-529-5065)
Medical issues:
20) Referencing historical Special Operations Forces (SOF) leadership and
directives from General (GEN) Stanley McChrystal and Admiral (ADM) William
McRaven, would DoD medical systems also benefit from a “flattening of the
organization”? Do current hierarchical systems sacrifice leadership, innovation, and
progress, and promote micromanagement, parochial processes, and risk aversion? (Mr.
BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, bj.keepers@centcpom.mil, 813-529-3354)
21) Do all garrison DoD Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs) truly provide
unique care to military personnel and their families? What are the pros and cons of
reducing the number of garrison DoD Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)
MTFs? What is the cost-benefit analysis for more care transferred to local civilian
facilities? Additionally, can more military medical personnel and assets be
decentralized and located with Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE)
units in order to accommodate a military Patient and Family Centered Home model?
(Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, bj.keepers@centcpom.mil, 813-529-3354)
22) As warfare has progressed from fighting conventionally as divisions,
brigades, and battalions to fighting unconventionally as companies, platoons, and
squads, how can medical systems best accommodate care in this paradigm? If a
paradigm shift is required, what medical structure will lead to a strategy and culture
that
best
supports
the
combatant?
(Mr.
BJ
Keepers,
CCJ3-O-CAL,
bj.keepers@centcpom.mil, 813-529-3354)
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C. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)
POC: Mr. Trevor Boyko, J9 (Academic Program manager), trevor.j.boyko.civ@mail.mil,
DSN: 314-430-5793
1) Recommend ways to synchronize EU, NATO, and U.S. goals for the
modernization of European militaries.
2) Assess the strategic implications of reduced national defense spending on
the long-term defense relationship between NATO, the EU, and the United States.
3) Assess the impact of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN/UNIFIED PROTECTOR
on the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
4) Analyze energy security in Europe, including operational, infrastructure,
and strategic energy security, and related implications for the U.S. Army.
5) Evaluate the long-term impact of International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) operations on NATO interoperability and sustainability.
6) Assess the prospects for Russo-American security and/or defense
cooperation.
7)

Assess the impact of growing diversity of populations on European security

policy.
8) Assess the effectiveness of security cooperation programs in promoting
stability in the Balkans.
9) Assess the strategic and operational implications of reconfiguring the U.S.
military presence in Europe.
10) Recommend ways for closing the U.S.-European military capabilities gap.
11) Recommend ways the United States can leverage European engagement
with China.
12) Assess the implications of U.S.-European defense industry cooperation
and/or integration.
13) Evaluate how the United States can leverage security cooperation tools (to
include Foreign military Sales [FMS], international military education and training
program [IMET], etc.), exercise program, and world-class training centers as force

23

multipliers to sustain capabilities/interoperability in Europe developed over the past
decade of war in Afghanistan.
14) Assess what
EUCOM/AFRICOM.

synergies

are

possible

between

NATO,

EU,

and

15) Evaluate the nonkinetic options for the theater commander in order to
achieve Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) End-states.
16) Evaluate the feasibility of deliberate multinational contingency planning.
17) Inventory and analyze authorities available within NATO, EU, and EUCOM
for engagement with the private sector to meet EUCOM/DoD objectives.
18) Evaluate the impact of the Arab Spring on cross-COCOM coordination for
EUCOM-AFRICOM-CENTCOM. Is coordination and response time improved? Are
there more lessons to be learned?
19) Assess the future of NATO post-ISAF.
20) Evaluate the synchronization of Knowledge Management and Lessons
Learned programs across theaters.

D. U.S. Northern Command
1)
Incident Assessment and Awareness (IAA) Capabilities in Support of
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA): DOD policy is to anticipate civil
authority requests (mission assignments) for assets in support of responding to
incidents. This policy is partly based upon the circumstances that existed at the end of
Hurricane Katrina. For the past several years, civil authorities have not taken advantage
of advanced Title 10 IAA capabilities. There are various conditions that contribute to
this decline in requests to include response time, legal issues, and institutional
resistance. One major argument has been the proliferation of sensors within the other
federal departments as well as state and local governments. Determine the efficacy of
the current DoD policy regarding employment of IAA capabilities and propose a
recommendation to continue the current policy or make a different proposal based
upon updated research. Make distinction, if any, between Title 10 and Title 32
capabilities. Address both service auxiliary and Emergency Management Assistance
Compact agreements. (POC: Mr. James Solano, HQ USNORTHCOM J33/JRC,
James.So/ano@northcom.mil; 719-554-6774 DSN 692-6774)
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2) Dual Status Command Concepts for Multistate Incidents: Dual status
command arrangements, which require the approval of both the President and the State
Governor, work well when a disaster or incident is confined to a single state. The
concept becomes problematic, however, for complex catastrophes spanning multiple
states, and requiring regional Dual Status Commands to reduce span of control issues.
No provision exists in the U.S. Constitution for regional authorities between the various
states and the federal government. As a result, no equivalent dual status command
arrangement has been developed for regional command and control that is acceptable
to both state and federal officials. Recommend an acceptable dual status command
arrangement for multistate incidents. POC: Mr. Donald Reed, HQ USNORTHCOM J35,
Donald.Reed@northcom.mil; 719-556-8227 DSN 834-8227)
3) Security Paradox in Terms of Homeland Defense: General Martin Dempsey,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), stated in May 2012 at the Joint Warfighting
Conference: “Today's security paradox, though, doesn’t call for larger or a smaller
military. Instead, it calls for a different military, one capable of deterring, denying, and
defeating threats across the entire spectrum of conflict. What does this mean for the
force? The joint force we have is in need of reset.” The Chairman went on to say, “We
also know that in the future, our homeland will not be the sanctuary it has been.” What
situations/conditions define the United States and its territories in a state of crisis, and
what authorities are required to permit the DoD to perform its defense of the homeland
task in a timely manner? (POC: Lieutenant Colonel [LTC] Kyle Marsh, HQ NORAD and
USNORTHCOM N2C2, Kyle.Marsh@northcom.mil; 719-556-8890 DSN 834-8890)
4) Counter Transnational Organized Crime networks: How do we foster an allin culture for integrating all the elements of national power in countering threat
networks, and how do we develop the skilled cultural awareness for overcoming
cultural barriers to collaboration, information sharing, and synchronized action? Does a
whole-of-government effort to counter transnational organized crime networks and
illicit activity require building virtual organizations as organizational networks? If so,
how should such networked structures be built, led, employed, and designed? (POC:
Dr. Rick Morris, Joint Task Force-NORTH, Rodier.Morris@jtfn.northcom.mil; 515-3137736)
5) Common Operating Picture (COP) in the Homeland: Shared Situational
Awareness is currently achieved through the use of multiple collaboration tools used by
DoD and Interagency Partners. Many of these platforms are not compatible and cannot
share information. In addition, a major limitation for NORAD and USNORTHCOM is
that certain tools used by the DoD do not allow non-DoD personnel access. At present,
each State/Territory/Agency uses different collaboration tools (i.e., Web EOC, SAGE,
Google Earth, CPOF, DCO, etc.). Most of these tools are not compatible and make it
very difficult to share information. Information sharing is critical to operational success
during a DSCA event. Classification of information during a DSCA event is important,
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and NORTHCOM requires certain collaboration be classified Secret. However, when
information is classified U.S. Secret, it cannot be shared with interagency partners,
traditional quadripartite allies, and noncleared personnel. COP is an ongoing and
expensive issue, and, while federal agencies are trying to find solutions to gaining a
national common operating picture, states are less interested because their ability to
“see” within their state is already relatively robust. Dissimilar systems, overclassification, access to organizational portals, and placing unclassified information on
classified systems are major impediments to generating a common operating picture at
a national level to inform decisions made by national leaders, to include DoD. The
National Guard Bureau (NGB) reports they have good collaboration connectivity with
the States and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), but stakeholders
need to agree on the goal—what needs to be shared—and then work on looking at
solutions. (POC: MAJ Richard Martin, HQ NORAD and USNORTHCOM J74,
Richard.Martin@northcom.mil; 719-556-7809, DSN 834-7809)
6) Timely DoD response to DSCA operations: The Mission Assignment (MA)
process and the National Response Framework (NRF) are challenged in near-complex
and complex catastrophes, as noted in Hurricane Sandy response operations. For
purposes of lessons learned, there was an assumption formed that in this complex
catastrophe scenario the NRF did not completely apply. If that were so, then some
replacement parameters needed to be established. For example, if a Title 10 (T10)
response is not driven by the MA process and Defense Coordinating Officer vetting,
then some sort of anticipatory immediate response type construct needs to be
established. While this rushing to the sound of the guns may be emotionally satisfying
or even politically expedient, it is inefficient and may even interfere with rapid
assistance as it as it potentially clogs up lines of communication and limited Base
Support Intermediate (BSI) space in/near the JOA as forces push forward without being
called forward. If Hurricane Sandy is seen as an archetype of a complex catastrophe,
then a careful analysis of the effectiveness of the DoD response within the context of
dual status commanders, lead federal agencies, and state response capabilities needs to
be conducted. It should incorporate insights from the on-going DoD complex
catastrophe effort. From this combined analysis, it may be possible to derive a “worst
case” T10 response model that builds on the NRF at least to the point where all players
understand the ground rules for response and have a common point of departure for
action. (POC: MAJ Richard Martin, HQ NORAD and USNORTHCOM J74,
Richard.Martin@norlhcom.mil; 719-556-7809 DSN 834-7809)
7) Emergency Management Assistance Compacts: The evolution and efficiency
of states’ Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs) is moving forward
rapidly. With the help of the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) in
Lexington, Kentucky, much more disaster response capability is becoming available
faster than it has in the past. All 54 states and territories are now legal partners.
Notification-to-deployment timelines have been drastically reduced by computer- aided
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resource identification, costing, etc. How should Title 10 forces’ planning be adjusted to
keep pace with evolving state EMAC progress? What is the relationship between
EMAC advances and the need for Title 10 DSCA responsiveness and capabilities? (POC:
Mr.
David
Wilkins,
HQ
NORAD
and
USNORTHCOM
J72,
David.Wilkins.ctr@norlhcom.mil; 719-474-8322, No DSN)
8) Arctic Maritime Surveillance: Investigate the optimal force layout (sensors,
ships, and aircraft) to detect and track maritime contacts in the Alaskan Arctic Region.
Recommend a maritime search and track sensor strategy for the Alaskan Arctic region.
(POC: MAJ Francis Mindrup, HQ NORAD and USNORTHCOM J84,
francis.mindrup@norlhcom.mil; 719-554-0587; DSN 692-0587)
9)
Electronic Warfare System Employment within Canada and the United
States: Examine the complex web of agencies and organizations connected to the
electromagnetic spectrum and how it impacts potential employment of electronic
warfare (EW) systems in defense of the Homeland and Canada. Provide a viable
concept of operations of employment of EW systems within Canada and the United
States in support of Homeland Defense and aerospace sovereignty. (POC: Mr. John
Wilson, HQ USNORTHCOM J39, john.wilson@northcom.mil; 719-554-1500; DSN 6921500)
E. U.S. Pacific Command
(POC: Major [MAJ] Tom Kucik, J561, Thomas.j.kucik.mil@mail.mil, 808-477-9107)
1)

U.S. Army theater security cooperation in Asia-Pacific:

a. How can the Army provide theater security cooperation to emerging
partners in the Asia-Pacific in a way that strengthens multilateral cooperation and
encourages adherence to international norms of behavior?
b. How does the U.S. Army determine the right mix or capabilities through
Security Cooperation Plans?
c. How can the U.S. Army ensure these activities are coordinated with other
services and regional allies?
2)

U.S. Army role in engaging and deterring China:
a. What role does the Army have to play in engaging and deterring China?

b. What are the requirements for U.S. Army forward presence in the Pacific
to meet this mission?
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c. How can the new four-star U.S. Army command in the Pacific support
this joint mission?
3)

Future of the U.S. Army on the Korean Peninsula:
a. What is the future of the U.S. Army on the Korean Peninsula?

b. What are the most important strategic considerations for managing
potential conflict on the peninsula?
4) U.S. Army balance between theater security cooperation and theater
engagement with a force ready to fight tonight:
a. How does the Army balance requirements for a force capable of
conducting theater engagement and security cooperation activities with a force ready to
fight tonight?
b. What has been the impact of the Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO)
Program and how can it be better leveraged to bring regional expertise to the theater?
F. U.S. Southern Command
1) Are China, Russia and Iran seeking to displace the US as the partner of choice
in the Caribbean, Central and South America? In depth study that focuses either on the
engagement of one partner of interest (China, Russia or Iran) in USSOUTHCOM or a
broader examination of the relationships that one or more countries in the
USSOUTHCOM AOR has with all three partners of interest.
(POC: Lt Col Dave Holm J53, david.m.holm.mil@mail.mil, 305-437-1838)
2) Is there a better way to fight the war on drugs? Examine the changing political
situation in both Central and North America regarding legalization and the current
counter-drug (CD) efforts. With the changing political landscape, how can military
efforts be redirected to increase effectiveness? Develop alternatives to US CD policy and
military operations.
(POC: Maj Beth Rosario J53, beth.a.rosario.mil@mail.mil, 305-437-2440)
3) IO during Mass Migration events. Identify IO themes, messages and audiences
in mass migration operations. Identify stakeholders in the USG and the public, private
sector. Create generic themes and messages for mass migration. Determine possible
unforced errors.
(POC: Lt Col Dave Holm J53, david.m.holm.mil@mail.mil, 305-437-1838)
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4) Socio-Cultural Analysis (SCA), also commonly known as the Human Terrain
Initiative (HTI), and Human Geography, (HG), provides knowledge and understanding
of the "people element," the underlying socio-cultural element that supports “Phase 0”
operations. For some combatant commands, Phase 0 Operations is the primary mission
with their respective partner nations. The U.S. Southern Command mission is to protect
the southern approaches to the United States.
Intelligence enables mission
accomplishment with an economy of force through partner engagement to build
partner nation capability. A better understanding of the diverse populations of the
region supports all USSOUTHCOM Phase 0-priority engagement activities and enables
development of mitigation strategies for future Joint Intelligence and Preparation of the
Environment (JIPOE) activities. This type of initiative is especially needed in an
operating environment like USSOUTHCOM's, which has no state-on-state conflict but
where fragile democracies and governing issues grow allow insidious threats such as
illicit trafficking, crime, authoritarianism and terrorism to seep across borders. A robust
and effective socio-cultural analytical capacity advances the broader DoD goal of
developing institutional and organic SCA knowledge and analysis appropriate for
contemporary and future security challenges. Requirements for this type of knowledge
will endure beyond any period of supplemental funding, as the need for socio-cultural
knowledge within USSOUTHCOM Area of Focus (AOF) will persist indefinitely.
Primary objective is to establish a baseline SCA capability at USSOUTHCOM.
(POC: Edward Daes J23, Edward.j.daes.civ@mail.mil, 305-437-0135)
5) Private Sector Contribution to Stability and Security. The DoD conducts many
stability operations around the world. Most of these activities are of short duration and
impact and have not been proven to substantially increase security or stability. Working
with private sector (i.e., business) has shown promise in extending the reach, efficiency,
effectiveness and sustainability of these types of activities. Produce a research project,
using case histories, that describes how the private sector can contribute to security and
stability in an uncertain environment (i.e. one that is recovering from conflict or has an
active stability issue related to insurgency, terrorism, drug trafficking organization,
etc.). Provide recommendations on how DoD can work with the private sector and the
Partner Nation to maximize the private sector's contribution to security/stability.
(POC:
Mr.
Shawn
Powell,
Chief
Business
Engagement
Branch
J9,
murray.powell1@hq.southcom.mil, 305-437-2743)
6) Using Social Media as a Method for Early Indications & Warnings of Biological
Threats. In July 2012, President Obama issued a national strategy for biosurveillance
that directs federal agencies to think outside the box in detecting incidents. "Consider
social media as a force multiplier that can empower individuals and communities to
provide early warning and global situational awareness," the guidelines stated. The
strategy cites a number of recent threats to underscore the need for innovative
biosurveillance, including the 2001 anthrax letters, 2003 SARS outbreak, 2009 bird flu
pandemic and2011 Japan nuclear emergency. The Department of Homeland has
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commissioned Accenture to test technology that mines open social networks for
indications of pandemics, according to the vendor. The Department of Defense,
Department of Health & Human Services, Department of Agriculture, and others have
implemented similar efforts. Google and other private sector partners have also
implemented activities that look to capitalize on social media and its ability to forecast.
This capstone project will examine what has been attempted/implemented/planned
across both the private sector and U.S. Government to explore how social media can be
utilized as an early indications & warnings tool. Students working on this capstone will
conduct a thorough literature review relating to past/present/intended applications of
social media being used to 1) serve as an early indication/warning tool and 2) forecast
biological threats. By the end of the capstone period the student will have developed a
detailed literature database on social media as it relates to being used/intended for an
early indication/warning of biological threats; 2) By the end of the capstone period the
student will have created a presentation that summarizes what they have found in the
literature; and 3) By the end of the capstone period the student will have developed a
framework for publishing an article for a professional journal that summarizes results
from their research. The capstone student will co-author an article with the Open
Source Center representative and HHS Senior Advisor at SOUTHCOM that will a)
report a literature review, b) describe how the USG is currently using social media for
early indications & warnings, and c) speculate on potential future directions for the
USG and other international partners as it relates to using social media for forecasting
biological threats.
(POC: CDR Michael Schmoyer J92, DHHS LNO, michael.schmoyer@hq.southcom.mil,
305-437-0523)
7) What's Good for the People is Good for the Company? An analysis of the
effectiveness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs in Latin America. A
study of CSR programs and effects. What is a CSR program? What are the objectives of
a CSR program? What elements contribute or detract from an organization being a
"good corporate citizen?" Does it contribute to "the bottom line" of the company and/or
the community within which the company/program acts? Is the "bottom line" more
than profits for the company? What are the benefits to the community, and are they
meaningful and sustainable? So your company has a CSR program – so what? Is it
"good business?" Do CSR programs contribute to the stability and prosperity of a
community/nation? How do CSR programs play into politics? Do CSR programs
undercut or enhance the legitimacy/effectiveness of government? The
student/candidate should explore all facets of select CSR programs in effect in Latin
America and/or the Caribbean. Does effectiveness vary when analyzing CSR programs
of foreign-owned companies versus domestic companies, large companies versus
medium or small companies, one industry segment versus another, etc? Perhaps
explore ways for government/military/SOUTHCOM to be mutually supporting with
the private sector to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of public-private
projects.
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(POC: Mr. John Dickerson, Dept of Commerce, john.dickerson@hq.southcom.mil, 305437-2290)

2. Functional Combatant Commands
A. U.S. Cyber Command
(POC: Mr. Blane Clark, J51 (Strategy Division), brclark@cybercom.mil, (443) 6542501)
1) What are the diplomatic and military implications of formally establishing a
NATO cyberspace military capability? What should a combined cyber force consist of,
with what rules of engagement, and what synchronization/deconfliction process? How
might a coalition execute cyberspace operations? How might other elements of national
power, available to the coalition from its members, be integrated?
2) In view of the strategic risks in and through cyberspace to U.S. critical
infrastructure and key resources, how might the private sector be integrated for a
whole-of-nation response? What legal (to include regulatory) policy and financial
security issues would need to be resolved?
3) What are the national strategic implications, both positive and negative, for
military involvement in cyber defense of non-DoD critical infrastructure? What are the
related political and economic issues that would require resolution?
4) Are current cyber policies, related Army and DoD directives and
instructions, and Army and Joint military doctrine sufficient to underpin defensive and
offensive effect operations, to achieve desired strategic outcomes?
5) What constitutes key strategic cyber terrain for DoD, both currently and 5
years from now? What criteria are germane to ascertain key strategic cyber terrain?
6) What characterizes strategic deterrence in cyberspace? Is deterrence a
precursor to defense? Is it part and parcel of a continuum from deterrence through
defense, to include cyberspace defense operations beyond the DoD Information
networks (DODIN)? Can deterrence be applied through a whole-of-nation approach?
7) What might constitute a value model for investments in cyberspace
capabilities and capacity, to include force structure for cyberspace security, DODIN
operations, and defensive and offensive cyberspace operations? What might constitute
the investment for each separately, and then as an aggregate? Are there dual purpose
investments?
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8) What might the corporate approach be for DoD to ensure career long
training and education continuum for a trained and ready cyber workforce?
9) Should the Army, and DoD at large, totally embrace a cloud computing
architecture in the evolution of the DODIN? What are the strategic and operational
challenges to doing so and not doing so?
10) What might be a useful model for more accurately assessing and portraying
measurable cyber threat levels beyond the two attributes of threat intent and capability?
How might such a model be implemented across all of DoD?
11) Is there a strategic trade-off economically between costs to defend versus
costs to attack? What would the parameters be of such a trade-off analysis? What
trending indications might be observable by such a trade-off analysis?
12) How should the concepts of sovereignty, ownership, possession, privacy,
theft, right of self-defense and other concepts of social, political and international norms
be considered and applied when planning and executing operations in cyberspace?
13) What are the ethical limits of taking action in cyberspace where there is an
apparent lack of established norms and rule of law? How might the U.S. Government
establish international norms of behavior in cyberspace? What about rule of law for the
international community regarding actions in cyberspace?
14) How could the Army develop and establish a cyber career path for both
Officers and Enlisted personnel? What would constitute accession and retention
criteria? What incentives might be integrated in accession and retention initiatives?
B. U.S. Transportation Command
1) Cost Efficiency in Defense Transportation-Logistics at the Expense of
Effectiveness:
Background/Additional Details: The current National Security Strategy
focuses on a more agile, rapidly-deployable, continental U.S. (CONUS)-based force
versus a more expensive, forward-based outside of the continental U.S. (OCONUS)
force. This agile force will be even more reliant on timely and reliable TRANSLOG
capabilities. The overwhelming majority of today’s defense logistics is performed by
commercial entities, both U.S. and international, because of their efficiency and lower
costs. Does DoD’s dependency on commercial TRANSLOG capabilities expose this
force to new and unforeseen vulnerabilities that could render it incapable of
deployment and/or sustainment? (Commander [CDR] James Bond/TCJ2-O/DSN 7707236/james.bond@ustranscom.mil)
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2) How should the Joint Staff deconflict/prioritize competing demands for
strategic lift between combatant commands in order to fight in two different theaters
simultaneously?
Background/Additional Details: During initial stages of deployment
operations there is a large demand for tankers and strategic Airlift. What considerations
should/would the Joint Staff use to arbitrate competing interests? What is the U.S.
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) role? (Major [MAJ] Aldaberto
Pagan/TCJ3-T/DSN 770-4931/adalberto.pagan@ustranscom.mil)
3) How can the Army’s 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) (7th TB(X))
currently under development be resourced/postured to provide a limited, early-in port
opening capability (C+7) for the geographic combatant commander?
Background/Additional Details: USTRANSCOM provides several theater
distribution enabler capabilities to the supported geographic combatant commander
which necessitates very short response times. Joint Force 2020 requires the future force
to be globally agile and rapidly deployable. USTRANSCOM must quickly project that
force despite the enemy’s anti-access/aerial denial efforts. The Joint Task Force Port
Opening (JTF-PO) Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) and Seaport of Debarkation
(SPOD) capabilities currently incorporate Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command (SDDC) and Navy elements to accomplish the mission for nonaustere and
undamaged seaports. However, the most demanding mission, opening/operating an
austere and damaged port, is heavily dependent on Navy forces attached to the mission
via a memorandum of agreement with USTRANSCOM. If the 7th TB(X), an 18th
Airborne Corps or 3rd ESC asset (Army decision TBD), is made modular, scalable, and
deployable by air to arrive in theater by C+7, the JTF-PO SPOD would be more effective
to support this theater commander-desired mission. (Pat Kennedy/TCJ5-SS/DSN 7704764/patrick.kennedy.ctr@ustranscom.mil)
4) The Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigns several important strategic
transportation and synchronization missions to USTRANSCOM. Two items in the Key
Strategic Issues List have a direct relationship to the USTRANSCOM UCP missions:
Item 13: “Determine COAs to equip the RAF concept.” This is an interesting
topic and worthy of more in-depth study. Of special concern to USTRANSCOM is how
rotational forces will be logistically supported with tactical casualty evacuation and
how it links with aeromedical evacuation.
Item 42: “Evaluate the tradeoffs of power projection, prepositioning and
forward stationing.” This is particularly relevant given the discussions among the
combatant commanders and Services chiefs in the CJCS Strategic Seminar Series.
(Mark Luttschwager/TCAC/DSN 770-5243/mark.luttschwager1.civ@mail.mil)
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3. Other Major Commands
A. U.S. Army Materiel Command
POC:
Mr.
Curt
Higdon,
HQAMC
marvin.c.higdon.civ@mail.mil, 256-450-6845

G3/4

(Strategic

Integration),

1) With reductions in forward deployed forces, we must determine the
appropriate force mix and Army Prepositioned Stocks strategy that allows us to remain
flexible, agile, and quickly deployable in our support to the warfighter. What is the
right mix of logistics functions between the Guard/Reserve and active forces, and what
assets must we maintain to project support to our regionally aligned forces?
2) Analyze future support requirements for SOF and small footprint
operations. How do these differ, and what are the needs of each? What COIN logistics
lessons learned apply to these situations?
3) Analyze future contractor logistic support as risk mitigation for reductions in
support forces. What types of support are best and less suited for contractors?
4) What are the key research, development, technology and engineering
capabilities necessary for the Army to support the future Organic Industrial Base and
maintain the Army’s technological advantage?
5) As we increasingly address nonpermissive environments and the cyber
threat builds against an ever more IT dependent global transportation network, we
must make renewed efforts to secure our lines of communication. What
communications infrastructure is key to ensuring the continuity of the global supply
chain? Which of them require preferential investments for security? What backup
capabilities are required / affordable to ensure redundancy?
6) As we restructure the generating force, we must first identify the “Core
capabilities” that are not inherently governmental and which capabilities cannot be
contracted out. We must consider what commercial off-the-shelf equipment may not be
available in the future and the acceptable risk on single source facilities. Based on these
considerations, should the Army restructure support to the Industrial base, and if so,
how?
7) In a period of dwindling resources, we must identify which of the eight or
nine sectors of the Organic Industrial Base (and underlying elements) are truly critical
enough to warrant preferential investment. Further, it is imperative that we determine
the appropriate levels required to maintain legacy production capabilities to support
the anticipated future force structure and new technologies. What capabilities can we
divest which can be rapidly regenerated or procured by another service? What is the
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acceptable level of risk from divestiture? Consider the mandated
government/contractor split and determine if it is still the proper ratio.
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8) In his strategic direction to the Joint Force, the CJCS directed that we
“Identify and reduce, but do not eliminate, overlapping capabilities across the
Services.” What are the areas that the Army can best accomplish or can alone
accomplish in support of the joint force? Are there areas such as joint repair facilities
where we can partner with sister services or Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and
Multinational (JIIM) partners to achieve a better end? How must we adapt our
equipment and training to be more interoperable in the JIIM? Should we invest in
adapting our equipment to allow greater interoperability with and reliance upon our
JIIM partners?

B. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
(POC: MAJ Chris Bowers, ATFC-EF, christopher.o.bowers.mil@mail.mil, 757-5015499)
1) Deterrence in the Deep Future (2030-40): How does the Army contribute to
unified action partner efforts to deter various nonstate actors? What are the implications
for the Army of the deep future? The operational environment in 2030-40 is likely to
include nonstate actors who have increased influence regionally and globally, with
access to technologies and capabilities that pose an actual threat to the United States.
These nonstate actors may include violent extremist groups, super-empowered
individuals (a la Thomas L. Friedman’s super-empowered angry man, not Jason
Bourne), malicious hackers, corporations, criminal enterprises, narco-terrorists, and
combinations of the preceding. The interests of these nonstate actors, and their makeup, are likely to be such that traditional concepts of deterrence are ineffective.
Future Concepts:
2) Clash of wills: How will the Army of the future (joint force) win the clash of
wills? War is a clash of wills—our will, our partners’ wills, and our adversaries’ wills. A
significant part of this clash is the “war of the narrative,” a nonkinetic conflict which
will be persistent and occur in the homeland and globally.
3) Strategic Landpower: What are the implications of strategic Landpower force
development? Strategic Landpower is the application of Landpower to achieve desired
strategic outcomes across the range of military operations. Joint land forces (Army, U.S.
Marine Corps (USMC), special operations) integrate all domains and provide the
means—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land,
resources, and people. The Army in particular provides sustained land forces to
buttress diplomatic actions and intervene when necessary.
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4) Expeditionary Maneuver: What capabilities does an Army expeditionary
maneuver concept require? The Army must project strategic Landpower in tailored and
scaled force packages to conduct a variety of missions and respond to a wide range of
threats, in alignment with joint concepts. Specifically address combat loading,
communications en route to the objective, joint fires employment, and global force
movement by sea and air to expedite reinforcement and sustainment of initial entry
forces.
5) Army Operating Concept: Assess the validity of the 2013 Army Operating
Concept (central idea, components of the solution, and supporting ideas). Does the 2013
Army Operating Concept align with joint concepts? Are new concepts and capabilities
required?
6) Army Functional Concepts: How must Army Functional Concepts develop
in support of the 2013 Army Operating Concept? Are new concepts and capabilities
required?
7) Science and Technology: What long-term investments are required today to
ensure an Army able to meet all required missions in 2030-40?
Capability Requirements:
8) Army advantages: How should the Army maintain and strengthen its
comparative advantages into the future:
a. Leader development—the Army is the premier institution developing
leaders;
b. Command and control—the ability to provide commanders intent and
intelligence over large distances and scalable formations;
c. Sustained logistics—the ability to logistically support large and small
formations around the world;
d. Mobility—the ability to tactically solve problems on the ground,
operationally build formations and employ them in current and future missions, and
strategically move forces around the world by air, land, and sea.
9) What capabilities are required to improve an Army entry force’s mobility,
protection, and lethality?
10) What capabilities are required to improve the Army’s ability to conduct
operations in multiple domains? The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Joint
Operational Access Concept, and 2013 Army Operating Concept all describe the need for
cross-domain synergy.
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Capability Solutions:
11) Human Dimension: Human capital is the Army’s number one priority. What
investments are necessary for the Army to be the experts in physical, cognitive, and
leader development, and individual and team design?
12) Human Domain/Context: The Army must understand and be able to
influence the context in which humans interact, particularly as the force gets smaller.
What investments must the Army make in education and training to build Soldiers’
socio-cultural intelligence quotient?
13) The Squad: What must the Army do to improve the squad’s ability to
achieve local overmatch in all warfighting functions? The Army delivers squads,
whether one or one thousand. Building the future squad correctly will achieve tactical
mobility for the Army. In particular address what the Army must do to lighten the load
on the squad and Soldiers through improved systems and discipline.
Gender Issues:
(POC: Colonel [COL] Lynette M.B. Arnhart, Deputy Director and Senior Military
Analyst TRADOC Analysis Center, lynette.m.arnhart.mil@mail.mil, 913-684-9214)
1) Compare the factors affecting readiness in gender integrated and nongender
integrated units, and study how measures of unit effectiveness are the same or different
between gender integrated and nonintegrated units.
2) Study how gender affects the development of team identification, task
cohesion, and the development of trust at team, squad, and platoon level.
3) What training is needed and what is the optimal level of training required
for effective gender integration?
4) What training is needed to effectively transfer women officers and
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) into previously closed military occupational
specialties (MOS). (The Army routinely transfers officers out of combat arms into other
branches but not vice versa. We do not know that applying the same training
mechanisms to the reverse process is adequate.)
5) Exam how morale in units is related to the incidence of sexual assault and
harassment.
C. U.S. Army Reserve Command
(POC: LTC Patrick M. Pascall, Patrick.m.pascall.mil@mail.mil, (703) 806-7368)
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The Army Total Force Policy (ATFP) is the theme of the Army Reserve’s 2014
Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) submission.
1) The main question for strategic analysis and research: How can the Army
Reserve (AR) best shape, implement and reinforce the ATFP?
a) Force Structure: Implementation of ATFP requires amending Army
regulations to establish a formal annual analysis of force structure options that
specifically includes consideration of the mix of operating and generating force
capabilities between the Active Component (AC) and AR. How does this policy change
the structure of the AR?
b) Readiness Policy/ Procedures: ATFP directs available mission and surge
forces deploy as integrated expeditionary forces to the maximum extent possible. How
does this affect AR Soldiers and their families?
c) Culture Shift: Implementation of ATFP may change the culture of the AR.
Describe the culture change and its impact to the AR.
d) Educate and Train: How will integration of the ATFP be reflected in Army
doctrine? How will the Army incorporate the ATFP into institutional
education/training? How could the Army benefit from, and implement, multicomponent faculty and students for all schools to include pre-command courses? How
could the Army benefit from, and implement, a multi-component approach to Total
Army Training for conventional forces?
e) Equipping: The Army’s equipping strategy must ensure that procurement
and equipping processes enable the AR to perform its missions. How does the ATFP
change determination of equipment status?
f) Personnel Management: ATFP aims to recognize the importance and
effectiveness of the all volunteer force by enabling Soldiers to move between the AC,
AR, and the Army National Guard (ARNG) during their careers. How does this impact
the AR? In addition, the Soldier for Life aspect of the ATFP enables Army, Government,
and community efforts to facilitate successful integration of our Soldiers, alumni,
retirees (Veterans) and their families within their communities. How does this benefit
the AR? What are the second and third order effects?
g) Common Standards: ATFP directs standardized AC and RC qualification
and professional development. How does this impact the AR?
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h) Doctrine Development: The ATFP requires adaptation of current AC and RC
training and doctrine publications. How can the AR best influence publication
development/revision to ensure commonality while retaining its uniqueness?
D. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)
1. Army Cyber:
(POC: William (Bronco) Lane, G-6, william.e.lane3.civ@mail.mil, 910-570-5643)
a.
Who should be in charge of cyber infrastructure and operations in the
Army? How do you best structure Army cyber for success?
b.
Should the Signal Center of Excellence and portions of the Military
Intelligence Center of Excellence be combined into a Cyber Center of Excellence?
c.
What is the future vision of the Signal/Cyber Corps when considering
diminishing resources?
d.
What strategy should be implemented to improve effectiveness of Army
cyber by divesting excess resources, harvesting and reshaping those resources,
and applying the resources where they can have the highest return on
investment within the cyber domain; especially considering diminishing
resources. What better business process improvements (i.e., Lean Six Sigma)
could be applied to Army cyber?
e.
What roles and functions should FORSCOM perform as the service force
provider for conventional forces with respect to cyberspace operations? (How
can FORSCOM best facilitate the manning, training, and equipping of
conventional forces to be able to operate effectively in the cyber domain?)
2. Future Operational Planning:
(POC: Barry Lowe, G-3, barrett.f.lowe.civ@mail.mil, 910-570-6334)
a.
Based on lessons learned and open-source intelligence from OEF, OIF,
OND, and other operations; has the Army sufficiently manned, trained, and
equipped the future force to be able to operate effectively in an future
environment?
b.
Is the Army prepared to operate in an environment/theater where the use
of a nuclear weapon has blanketed a significant portion of the area of operations
with electromagnetic pulse (EMP) causing significant damage to Army mission
command systems?
3. Homeland Security:
(POC: Robert Johnson, CIG, robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil, 910-570-5082)
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a.
What emerging capabilities can enhance mission effectiveness of Army
units committed for Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) missions,
particularly in terms of communication and relief supply distribution?
b.
In what new ways can Title 10 forces (Active Army and U.S. Army
Reserve) provide enhanced capabilities to NORTHCOM during DSCA?
c.
Can traditional campaign planning and theater design improve planning
for DSCA?
4. Regional Strategic Issues:
(POC: Robert Johnson, CIG, robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil, 910-570-5082)
a.
How can the Army better prepare Soldiers and units for language and
cultural knowledge training requirements prior to deployment into Combatant
Commanders’ areas of responsibility in support of theater security cooperation
and joint exercises?
b.
How should the Army prepare Military Intelligence Soldiers to support
geographic combatant command (GCC) intelligence requirements, with
Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) in mind? What is the best method to ensure
effective/efficient utilization of Intelligence Readiness and Operations Capability
(IROC) to its full capacity in support of the RAF concept?
c.
What is the optimal balance of Army formations to be assigned to the
various combatant commanders versus Army service retained?
5. Special Operations Forces (SOF)-Conventional Forces (CF) Interdependence.
(POC: Barry Lowe, G-3, barrett.f.lowe.civ@mail.mil, 910-570-6334)
a.
What are the capability shortfalls of SOF that must be met by CF?
b.

What are the capability shortfalls of CF that must be met by SOF?

c.
How is CF support to SOF (and vice versa) identified and resourced—
both in pre-deployment and in theater?
6. Military Change in a Resource Constrained Environment.
(POC: Charles B. O'Brien, G-8, charles.b.obrien.civ@mail.mil, 910-570-5870)
a.
How can Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution System (PPBES)
be made more responsive and agile in reacting to requirements that come out of
cycle or result from Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) sync conference
results than currently seen with the traditional PPBES timelines for POM, BES,
President’s Budget, and Appropriations?
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b.
What possible better business process and prioritization improvements
could be applied to the Army POM build process?
c.
How do we synchronize PPBE, Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS),
Global Force Management, Security Cooperation planning (including partner
nations), and Army Force Generation processes and cycles to ensure the U.S.
Army effectively provides and sustains ready Landpower capabilities to the
combatant commanders?
d.
Should the U.S. Army develop a new force management and workforce
strategy that includes Army civilians as part of base Table of Organization and
Equipment (TOE) documentation? What is the proper mix of uniformed military
and Army civilians within the Army's operating force? How would HR policies
need to be modified to reflect greater utilization of Army civilians within the
operating force?
e.
Could the Army quantify the costs associated with regenerating BCTs
readiness within the ARFORGEN cycle in a timely enough manner as to inform
the budget process? Should there be an 'operational offset cost' to be paid by the
Combatant Commanders to augment the 'institutional reset' costs incurred
through the Army Force Generation process?
f.
How does the U.S. Army reorganize or reallocate roles and
responsibilities between the Department (Secretariat and ARSTAF), ACOMs,
DRUs, and ASCCs to gain strategic efficiencies?
g.
How does the U.S. Army “operationalize” its institutional and generating
force capabilities to build partner capacity within an Army operational lifecycle
framework? Would this occur at the cost of the core mission of preparing Army
capabilities for employment?
h.
How can military construction (MILCON) processes be changed to
enhance congressional involvement and oversight?
7. Alignment of Power Projection Platforms.
(POC: Barry Lowe, G-3, barrett.f.lowe.civ@mail.mil, 910-570-6334)
a.
Does the Army have the required power projection platforms
(installations/airfields) to provide rapid deployment of expeditionary
capabilities to meet combatant commander requirements?
b.
Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) units aligned under
RAF may not be located on/near existing power projection platforms. What is
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the impact to readiness and/or meeting combatant commander requirements if
platforms don’t exist? What alternatives are available to accomplish the rapid
deployment of RAF units?
8. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
(POC: Robert Johnson, CIG, robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil, 910-570-5082)
a.
Should combat operations be funded through the budget supplemental
process? If yes, how can the Army POM process accommodate contingencies
and other unforecasted requirements?
b.
How can the Army both increase and improve interagency involvement in
combat operations and in the Army’s planning and exercise programs?
c.
How do we tailor and prepare Landpower capabilities to best deter rogue
powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors?
d.
How can the military better leverage other elements of Diplomatic,
Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) to deter existing and emerging
threats?
e.
What are the essential Security Force Assistance (SFA) skills required to
support Combatant Commanders’ Theater Security Cooperation Programs?
What changes need to be made to the Army’s SFA training to meet the
Combatant Commanders requirements?
f.
How does the U.S. Army best leverage other U.S. Government
departments and agencies' funds for security cooperation/assistance to train its
formations and Soldiers?
9. Readiness and Deployability:
(POC: Robert Johnson, CIG, robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil, 910-570-5082)
a.
What improvements can be made to increase the deployability of service
members, improve transparency to Commanders, and address the issue of
deployability in relation to readiness?
10. Joint and Service Training.
(POC: Robert Johnson, CIG, robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil, 910-570-5082)
a.
What is the gap between where Service METL ends and Joint METL
begins? Does our current joint training framework provide a ready joint force for
the Combatant Commanders to receive and organize in time of crisis? If the
current framework does not, what are ways to improve the framework?
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b.
Specifically for Joint Task Force-Headquarters (JTF-HQ) capable
formations, how much of their training under their Service must be aimed at JTFHQ readiness, and how is this joint business to be conducted from a resourcing
and standards perspective?
11. Single Reserve Component.
(POC: William (Bronco) Lane, G-6, william.e.lane3.civ@mail.mil, 910-570-5643)
a.
What are the implications of reorganizing all Reserve Component into a
single component?
b.
What are the legal requirements and resource implications impacted by a
reorganization of the Reserve Component into a single component?
c.
How could the Reserve Component be reshaped to yield the biggest
return on investment?

4. Other Organizations
A. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)
Sponsor: Major General MG Harold Greene
(POC: Professor Louis Yuengert, USAWC, Louis.g.yuengert.civ@mail.mil, 717-2454790)
1) Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
(OEF) drove innovation and change in so many ways. As we return to the United States,
what will provide the demand signal for innovation and change?
2) What does an active rapid acquisition process look like? The National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) ought to be part of a continuum which includes REF
activities, regionally aligned forces, the activities of Battle labs and research laboratories,
as well as industry. Recommend a campaign plan for experimentation that weaves all of
these activities together.
3) How do we implement reversibility and expandability with respect to
modernization and equipping?
B. Director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessments and
Program Evaluation
Sponsor: Lieutenant General (LTG) Robert Lennox
(POC: Professor Louis Yuengert, USAWC, Louis.g.yuengert.civ@mail.mil, 717-2454790)
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1)

How should Army airlift requirements be determined?

2) What is the strategic purpose, including strategic mobility implications, of
Army Pre-Positioned Stocks given the change in U.S. strategy toward the Pacific?
3) How does the Army explain operations tempo (OPTEMPO) dollars and the
strategic impact of cuts in funding for OPTEMPO?
4) With regards to depot maintenance, what must the throughput be to justify
depot infrastructure? What are the appropriate metrics to measure depot performance
and efficiency? “Justify” implies that we may be justifying closing depots based on lack
of throughput.
C. Center for Army Analysis
(POC: Mr. H. J. Orgeron, herman.j.orgeron.civ@mail.mil, 703-806-532 )
1) Strategic and Campaign Assessment Doctrine. After a decade of war, the
international community and the Department of Defense (DoD) have developed a
significant reliance on qualitative and quantitative reports and information from major
theater commands (such as the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan) and strategic-level
headquarters. Much of the work done to provide this information comes from
operations assessment organizations. Assessment doctrine, techniques, organizations,
and processes have changed much during this time of conflict. In recent years, the
various defense communities have strived to capture the “lessons learned” from
assessments work—especially in the complex areas involving strategy and campaigns.
The focus of this project would include the following: (1) identify and capture the
current status of assessment techniques and procedures at the combatant
command/theater campaign level; (2) extract the ones that provide useful insights and
applications to the overall community; (3) incorporate these insights into an unclassified
report for use by allied assessment communities, the DoD, and/or the Army; and (4)
publish an article describing the possible interactions between assessment and planning
(to include general ideas, concepts, techniques and processes). NOTE: This project can
be scoped to an area of interest fitting a student project—the primary idea is to improve
doctrine and organizations at the strategic or campaign level.
2) Dissolution of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations
Research) and Its Impacts on the Army. On April 6, 2006, the Deputy Under Secretary of
the Army disestablished the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army
(Operations Research), also known by the acronym DUSA(OR). The various tasks
assigned to that office (along with the associated personnel) were redistributed to
several organizations and staff elements within the Army. Since that time, the Army
employs quantitative analysis in support of specific efforts in a decentralized manner.
In recent years, this decentralized situation has come under scrutiny by some of the
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Army’s senior leaders. The focus of this project centers on (1) determining where the
functions and personnel of the DUSA(OR) went; (2) assessing whether Headquarters,
Department of the Army benefited or not from the changes, (3) and analyzing how well
the Army’s quantitative analysis capabilities support the Army’s senior leaders at the
Army/strategic level.
3) Assessing the Stryker Brigade. Under the term of General Eric Shinseki, the
Army developed, organized, fielded, trained, and deployed a new brigade. Originally
intended to provide an interim solution to a strategic challenge, the Stryker endures to
this day as a permanent part of the Army’s combat capabilities. The goal of the project
is to highlight how the Army executed such a new concept in a short period of time and
analyze how well the original concept has survived the test of time. Recommendations
on how the Army can leverage this experience to change its policies and Army-wide
processes are well within the scope of the project.
4) Campaign Battle-Space Ownership—Special Operations Forces and General
Purpose Forces (SOF/GPF). There are myriad anecdotes about C2 challenges in Phase
IV/V Operations, especially where SOF and GPF “run into each other” while they are
trying to accomplish their missions in the same battle-space. In recent operational
experiences, the boundaries of SOF and GPF do not coincide, and
liaison/communications linkages do not always take place. This leads to GPF
tactical/operational commanders (who own the battle-space) having operational SOF
forces in their area. These forces may answer to multiple GPF commands as well as the
SOF chain of command. The goal of this project centers on determining where SOF and
GPF truly come together, based on recent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere. Furthermore, the project should identify any ongoing solutions or processes
that address the challenge. Given a systemic challenge in battle-space ownership and
coordination, the project can suggest ways for future campaign commanders to relieve
this conflict and improve C2 in these operations.
5) NATO Planning and Training Scenarios. The DoD employs a scenario-based
approach in identifying and/or describing its strategic and campaign systems uses and
requirements. These scenarios serve many purposes—planning, war gaming, training,
and others. These scenarios provide a common context and framework to the Services
and organizations of the DoD, and promote coordination among the Services and
organizations of DoD. Furthermore, the common frame of reference for training and
planning purposes greatly assists in understanding unity of effort, individual element
capabilities and limitations, and other areas. Given the increased emphasis on
international cooperation and understanding, scenario projects and products that can be
used for international exercises could prove very helpful in understanding coalition
warfare. NATO, in particular, has been active in international level campaigns. This
project would assess the current status of scenario usage in an international forum
(and/or within NATO), identify if there is a desire or need for constructing scenarios in
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promoting NATO’s goals, and describe what such a process, if needed, would look like.
NOTE: This effort could be modified to discuss international scenario challenges
outside of a NATO context but within an international framework.
6) Adaptable forces vs. Specialized Forces. DoD employs a force planning construct
to accomplish a set of future requirements. To do so, it characterizes a collection of
scenarios and quantifies the forces required to meet those scenarios. The services, in
turn, identify a collection of forces to meet those requirements as closely as possible.
This process serves as the foundation for the services’ structures. However, those
theoretical futures never occur. The Army in particular finds itself meeting
requirements for which it was not designed. To mitigate the differences between future
requirements and eventual real requirements, the Army’s units “adapt” to accomplish
secondary missions (typically via augmentation, additional equipment, and additional
training). The goal of this project would address the issue of building Army force
structure that can address a wide range of challenges while maintaining core
capabilities. Can the Army characterize factors that make some units more “adaptable”
than others? Can the Army structure itself so as to maximize adaptability for a broad
range of possible futures?
7) Military Integration with Other Government Agencies (OGA) in the Counterdrug
Fight. The U.S. military has three task forces dedicated to counterdrug operations on or
near our southern border: JTF-North, CJTF-West, and CJTF-South. The mission is run
by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the use of military forces is
complicated by laws regarding the use of Federal forces in the continental United States
(CONUS). There appears to be a challenge of unity of command, military policy, and
U.S. law that impedes the military’s ability to contribute to the counterdrug fight. This
project would review the literature, history, and current status of these counterdrug
operations, provide an assessment of their effectiveness in using military assets, and
highlight possible alternatives/options on ways to improve the use of the military (to
possibly include maintenance of status quo or termination of military usage).
D. U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Centers (ECBC)
(POC: Dr. Augustus W. Fountain III, Senior Research Scientist (ST),
augustus.w.fountain.civ@mail.mil, 443-722-5724)
Examine the strategic implications of the use of weaponized incapacitants,
pharmaceuticals, and bio-regulating drugs for internal law enforcement,
counterterrorism, and military operations.
Background: The Third Review Conference of the States Parties of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) met in April 2013 without being able to adopt language
addressing the use of “incapacitants.” The use of a fentanyl cocktail by Russian special
forces in October 2002 to end a hostage crisis in the Dubrovka Theater by Chechen
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extremists brought their use into the international spotlight. Despite the deaths of 125
hostages, there was no public outcry on the use of a knock down agent to resolve the
crisis. In December 2011, the European Court of Human Rights found the Russian
government not-guilty regarding the use of the fentanyl cocktail; citing that the
intended use of the incapacitant was law enforcement purposes. This ambiguity in the
CWC is bearing witness to a surge of research and development into fentanyls and
other pharmaceuticals by CWC signatory countries. While these chemicals are deemed
incapacitants, under certain concentrations and conditions they can be lethal, as
evidenced by the deaths at the Russian opera house. The dual use of these and other
pharmaceuticals makes monitoring proliferation activities difficult. With this trend,
there is reason for concern that the United States and its allies could experience these
chemicals in future combat actions.
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agencies have provided issues of contemporary concern.
For additional information, contact:
Captain Mark Light
Navy Senior Service Representative, U.S. Army War College
Office: 717-245-3238
Mark.f.light.mil@mail.mil
3. U.S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps University Research Topic Nominations. Topics have been submitted for
Annual Year 2013-14 and are organized by major combat functions: Command &
Control, Maneuver, Fires, Intel, Logistics, Force Protection, and Cyber.
For additional information, contact:
Colonel Roger McFadden
Marine Corps Senior Service Representative, U.S. Army War College
Office: 717-245-4862
Roger.J.McFadden.mil@mail.mil
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